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Chapter IV
Rorty and literature, 
or about the priority of the "wisdom 
of the novel" to the "wisdom of philosophy"
1.
Let us start our peregrinations to various aspects of Rorty’s 
considerations devoted to literature with the most important and 
at the same time most general statement: it seems that Richard 
Rorty’s approach to fiction results from its consistently -  to use 
here his own opposition -  "solidarity-related" account; the "other 
side", literary self-creation, remains programmatically and 
intentionally undiscussed with much seriousness. One can just get 
the impression that literature, and the novel in particular, has been 
burdened with an ("unbearable") heaviness of responsibility... 
Does in Rorty’s reflections the novel appear as a source of 
multifarious metaphors, of the whole worlds born out of the writer’s 
imagination? Is there in it another dimension of the reality in which 
mundane obligations no longer bind the human being and where 
one can give rein to usually hidden desires and passions? The 
answer is in the negative.
The world of fiction of which Richard Rorty writes is a 
pragmaticized one -  and fiction itself is supposed first to build, 
and then to defend a democratic, liberal order as one of utopias 
feeding that order. On the other extreme, let us hasten to add, 
there is philosophy with its right to choose self-creation (the right 
given so willingly to these fragments of Derrida of which the most 
famous are perhaps the telecommunicational phantasies from The 
Post Card or quasi-polemics from Limited Inc.). The situation as 
outlined by Rorty might be described in the following manner: the 
writer has to be responsible (similar -  although with a different 
ideal to -  Sartre’s conception of littérature engagée), the 
philosopher may indulge in certain irresponsibility -  or rather 
certain irrelevance with respect to social problems. It is as if "poets" 
are returned back to polis after more than twenty five centuries
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and made to think about the state and laws, relieving at the same 
time at least some philosophers from the respectful Platonic duty 
of "enlightening the darkness" of the world. In today’s intellectual 
climate it is probably easier to accept a new role for philosophers 
than to accept putting part of the burden of responsibility for the 
success of a contingent, like it or not, experiment of liberal 
democracies on the writer’s shoulders. Rorty thus seems to me to 
be making both one step forward and two steps backwards, as his 
pragmatism does not allow for leaving society at the mercy of 
spiritless technocrats, social engineers of the future, when poets 
and philosophers no longer have much to say. (The opposite 
direction is taken by Jacques Derrida, to insert here a short note 
in parentheses. He accords this "strange institution called 
literature", as he writes, the right of tout dire, of saying everything, 
the power of breaking away from existing rules and conventions, 
of questioning and dislocating them.
The writer can say whatever he wants to, or whatever he is able 
to, remaining in an institutional zone protected against any 
censorship; the institution of literature is according to him strictly 
linked to "the coming about of the modern idea of democracy".1 
So while in Rorty literature "fights" for democracy, in Derrida 
literature can already "make use" of its charms). Philosophy and 
poetry, to a large extent, are on the "private side", while on the 
"public" one there is the novel together with politics. That is the 
picture one can get from Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity and 
related essays from Philosophical Papers, especially the second 
volume of them. Conceptual difficulties of philosophy and 
individual idioms of poetry do not seem to change the world -  the 
key to social reality is held by liberal politics and the novel that 
shapes human sensitivity. This is a very pragmatic solution which 
rejects traditional roles and obligations ascribed in culture to 
literature and philosophy. What I intend to discuss in this chapter 
is what may have pushed Rorty to such conclusions (as I want to 
read them) and where he finds justification or support for them.
1 Jacques Derrida, Acts of Literature, ed. by D. Attridge (New York: 
Routledge, 1992), p. 37.
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A pragmatic line of reasoning is seemingly simple, and is 
certainly convincing: liberal society does not need "philosophical 
foundations" any more -  liberal culture will be much better served 
with still more refined self-descriptions. The natural sciences are 
no longer, as he puts he, “the most interesting or promising or 
exciting area of culture"2 and the imagination of the youth is moved 
by the arts and politics. A cultural hero of postmodernity is a "strong 
poet" -  rather than a warrior, priest, sage or natural scientist who 
is searching for objective truth. Ironists do not take philosophers 
as their moral advisors any more, as the whole French and 
German Enlightenment tradition would wish, turning instead to 
literary critics, as they fear getting stuck in one single vocabulary 
-  the one in which they have been educated. Therefore they 
change perspectives and compare redescriptions by various 
figures with one another rather than redescriptions with their 
"originals". Finally -  they read a lot of books (which is a guiding 
trait of the intellectual), "spending] more of their time placing 
books than placing real live people"3 (And it was already Marx 
who said in one of his letters: "I am a machine doomed to devour 
books", as Paul Johnson reminds in his History of the Jews). 
Literature has more to say and more to do -  together with literary 
criticism; traditional philosophy is less interesting to culture and in 
this account gives less to it. Thus, describing various possibilities, 
either we will deal only with literature, or we will try to think of 
another possibility of the other, of philosophy, taken off the Kantian 
pedestal, or we will think philosophy through with the help of a 
specific kind of literature (as Frenchmen do, starting with Bataille 
and Klossowski to Foucault and Derrida), o r-fina lly -w e  will keep 
silence in the manner of the young Wittgenstein, pretending that 
nothing has changed in philosophy in the times of postmodernity. 
And that latter possibility will probably be the cultural end of 
philosophy.
Culture and society need many "vocabularies of moral 
deliberation" (as Rorty calls them in his text on Freud, "Freud and 
Moral Reflection") which constantly have to be coined, developed,
2 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 52.
3 Ibidem, p. 80.
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transformed and made up-to-date as the world changes. The 
Kantian idealistic morality of duty, one side of moral philosophy 
falling to pieces (the other side being politics, as in Marx or 
Bentham) caused the essential pauperization of the possibilities 
of moral deliberation. The result of closing of the possibilities of 
moral philosophy (of ethics) was in Rorty's view the opening of 
possibilities of enriching moral reflection by "novelists, poets and 
dramatists".4 Culture cannot stand void -  so it was filled with the 
nineteenth-century novel. And it has been since then that 
"literature" cares more than "philosophy" for the said vocabularies 
of moral deliberation, the central role in culture of which can only 
be doubted if a "human nature" common to all is believed. The 
"human nature", the essence, from which philosophers as the only 
entitled to, deduce how is one to behave, and then pass that 
knowledge to people (like those Platonic heroes who were able to 
make a "journey upward", "look at the Good", and then to go back 
down here to "those people in chains", being their guides in the 
unreal world of shadows5).
So far I have been using the "self-creation"/ “solidarity" and the 
"private"/"public" distinctions, but one can easily add to them other 
pairs, more or less metaphoric, coming from various Rorty’s texts, 
such as, for instance, "sublimity" and "decency", "private 
narcissism" and "public pragmatism", “private irony" and "liberal 
hope" or "Trotsky" and the "wild orchids".6 These seem to be 
various approaches to and different accounts of the fundamental 
opposition of the two themes (still present over the years in Rorty): 
the romantic and the pragmatic ("romantic" in the sense of the text 
on "Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century 
Textualism" and "pragmatic" -  in the sense found in "Pragmatism 
and Philosophy"7). Pragmatic and romantic conceptions of 
philosophy are the two reactions to "Plato-Kant canon", two 
different and opposite responses to metaphysics (as well as to
4 Richard Rorty, PP 2, p. 156.
5 Plato, The Republic, 519D.
6 Richard Rorty, PP 1, p. 210; CIS, pp. 73-96; "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids".
7 Richard Rorty, CP, pp. 139-159; "Pragmatism and Philosophy" in After 
Philosophy. End or Transformation, K. Baynes et al (eds.), pp. 26-66.
Husserl with his vision of philosophy als strenge Wissenschaft). 
As philosophy can no longer be science in an unquestionable way, 
let it be politics -  that is Dewey’s answer -  or metaphor -  that is 
the answer of Heidegger after his "turn" (to follow the title of Rorty’s 
essay: "Philosophy as Science, as Metaphor, and as Politics"). 
These are answers going in opposite directions for it is not easy 
to make politics metaphorical or make metaphor political (suffice 
it to say how Walter Benjamin was afraid of aestheticization of 
politics; and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in his Heidegger, Art, and 
Politics called National Socialism-"national aestheticism"); these 
are two incommensurable, metaphilosophical conceptions of the 
role of philosophy in culture. But Rorty would be willing to be at the 
same time -  and this is one of key points of the reading outlined 
here -  that pragmatist and that "strong poet", be a utopian social 
engineer and a visionary, both to serve his community and to make 
use of intellectual pleasures derived from self-creation. For he 
bears in mind that in the future we will not be turning to the 
philosophers for rescue and advise as our ancestors turned to the 
priests -  "we shall turn instead to the poets and the engineers, the 
people who produce startling new projects for achieving the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number"8
Rorty consistently avoids choosing between the romanticism of 
the poet and the pragmatism of the politician and social engineer; 
we have to agree here with Nancy Fraser who says that according 
to Rorty "it is the desire to overcome the implacable split between 
public and private life that is at the root of many theoretical and 
political difficulties".9 It may be perhaps so that while the Romantic 
need turns Rorty to philosophy, the pragmatic one directs his 
attention to literature, and to the novel in particular. Philosophy, 
inessential, insignificant in today’s culture and devoid of 
transformative powers as it seems to be, is located by him in the 
same camp as poetry, while the novel which transforms 
vocabularies of moral deliberation and shapes liberal sensitivity
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8 Richard Rorty, PP 2, p. 26 -  emphasis mine.
9 Nancy Fraser, “Solidarity or Singularity? Richard Rorty between 
Romanticism and Technocracy" in Reading Rorty, ed. A. Małachowski (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 311.
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gets closer to politics and liberal social engineering. Theory is 
"de-politicized", politics -  "de-theorized", as Thomas McCarthy 
puts it in his reaction to Rorty.10 12Philosophy -  as in Zygmunt 
Bauman’s Intimations of Postmodernity11 -  either hides behind 
silent walls of the Academy, or takes alliance with literary criticism 
and poetry. The direct link between (philosophical) theory and 
(political) practice is broken. As Rorty puts it, "we philosophy 
professors are people who have a certain familiarity with a certain 
intellectual tradition", and nothing more, let us add, "as chemists 
have a certain familiarity with what happens when you mix various 
substances together".1
To sum up briefly these notes outlining the background for a 
more detailed reflection: the pragmatic impulse, ideals of liberal 
democracy, the priority of democracy to philosophy etc. push 
Rorty’s thinking towards literature as a certain democratic utopia 
(the novel as Milan Kundera’s "paradise of individuals"), the 
Romantic im pulse, on the other hand -  from Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Mind to Derrida, pushes his thinking towards 
self-creational kind of philosophy. There is no third way. Both 
ethoses constitute at the same time his liberal sensitivity -  what is 
important is other people’s suffering, their pain and humiliation as 
well as what he has named over the years in various texts with 
different words: "self-enlargement", "self-invention", or already in 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature -  "edification" (derived from 
Gadamer’s Bildungfrom his Truth and Method). Both ethoses are 
constantly present, both give birth to confessions like, on the one 
hand, "what matters is our loyalty to other human beings clinging 
together against the dark"13 and on the other hand: "the pragmatist 
philosopher has a story to tell about his favorite, and least favored, 
books -  the texts of, for example, Plato, Descartes, Hegel, 
Nietzsche, Dewey and Russell"14, or, to put it still stronger:
10 Thomas McCarthy, "Ironie privée et décence publique" in Lire Rorty. Le 
pragmatisme et ses conséquences (Paris: Editions de l’éclat, 1992), p. 94.
11 Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1992), p. 16.
12 Richard Rorty, "Trotsky...", p. 152.
13 Richard Rorty, CP, p. 166.
14 Richard Rorty, PP 1, p. 82.
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"nothing is more important than saving our liberal institutions"15 
from the pragmatic side and "redescribing ourselves is the most 
important thing we can do"16 from the Romantic side. It is difficult 
to abandon any of the two sides, nor can they be agreed with each 
other: the only solution seems to be the public-private split, the 
split of both orders. Hence maybe Rorty’s specific attitude towards 
literature (the novel) that satisfies the need of communal thinking 
as opposed to a post-Philosophical attitude to philosophy, 
satisfying the need of "privatized thinking" (as Rorty writes of 
Derrida in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity). Let us add that is 
just a general tendency in his considerations rather than some rigid 
distinction. We will attempt in the present chapter to place his 
philosophical reflections on literature in a wider context of his views 
about the role and place of philosophy in contemporary culture.
2.
Richard Rorty in his philosophizing asks, among other things, 
about -  in a quite pragmatic manner -  what literature and 
philosophy can give us, elevating the former on numerous 
occasions by means of juxtaposing its usefulness with the 
apparent uselessness of traditional philosophy. He brings them 
close to each other -  treating them as two "kinds of writing". He 
does not make use of criticism already traditional today: that is, 
e.g. of showing the philosophical background of literary works 
(themes, questions, oppositions, conceptuality -  as if the second 
"bottom" of literature) -  nor does he seek the "literariness" of 
philosophical works. As a matter of fact, he does not change the 
status of literature; instead, together with the whole conception of 
philosophy being developed since Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature (1979), he takes off from philosophy the place accorded to 
it so far (at least since the Kantian times).
For in the cultural conversation going on (the word 
"conversation", incidentally, being the key-word to a vast part of 
attacks on that book), the philosopher has so far had a privileged
15 Richard Rorty, "Brigands et intellectuels", Critique 493-494, Juin-Juillet 
1988, p. 485.
16 Richard Rorty, PMN, pp. 358-359.
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position, the first and the last word belonged to him, it was he who 
knew better as he knew the widest -  philosophical -  context of 
questions and answers. For it was he who used to decide, in the 
last instance, about the claims to knowledge of all the other 
domains of culture. Rorty says that the central concern of the 
whole hitherto existing philosophy was
a general theory of representation, a theory which will 
divide culture up into areas which represent reality well, 
those which represent it less well, and those which do 
not represent it at all (despite their pretense of doing
Thus, on the one side of that landscape there was philosophy 
as a Kantian "tribunal of pure reason", on the other side of it there 
were claims made by all other areas of culture which philosophy 
eitherrejectedoraccepted.Philosophywould "ground" knowledge 
claims, it was a "foundational" discipline, overwhelming and 
legitimating other domains. The abandonment of the Kantian 
perspective (reinforced still in the twentieth century by Russell’s 
and Husserl’s ideal of "scientific" and "exact" philosophy) would 
be an attack on the philosopher’s self-image -  would be an 
abandonment of the idea that his voice "always has an overriding 
claim on the attention of the other participants in the 
conversation".17 8 This would be -  to be more precise -  a collapse 
of the idea that there is some "philosophical method" or some 
"philosophical point of view" which enables the philosopher, by 
reason of his profession to express interesting opinions, ex officio, 
on the subject of e.g. psychoanalysis, moral dilemmas of humanity 
or values of literary works. Philosophy in Rorty’s account becomes 
less important and thereby the philosopher himself becomes less 
important, the philosopher whose opinions have so far been 
important owing to the importance of the philosophical discipline 
itself... Philosophy cannot escape from history, therefore Rorty 
asks why it became an autonomous discipline, foundational for the
17 Ibidem, p. 3.
18 Ibidem, p. 392.
whole of culture? It was because German idealists of the 
nineteenth century, he goes on explaining, told us that such a 
discipline was the "hope of mankind"19 and we have kept on 
believing them (just as we kept believing in what Lyotard calls the 
Enlightenment "metanarrative of Emancipation" as long as dark 
clouds of the "signs of history" did not cover the horizon -  which, 
incidentally, separates Rorty and Derrida from e.g. Lyotard and 
Baudrillard). To sum up, Rorty elevates literature, locating at the 
same time philosophy on an equal footing with other disciplines, 
devoid of any old privileges. Old philosophy, or philosophy with a 
capital "P", as Rorty sometimes claims, is a dubious domain, 
considering, pragmatically, its twentieth-century failings on the one 
hand, and its cultural deadness on the other.
So Rorty does not apply philosophical conceptuality to 
literature, does not seek its "philosophical core" by removing 
surface layers of vocabulary, style or getting at its "blind spots" or 
unsaid "margins". He does not ask a question about the essence 
of literature, asking instead about what it is doing, how it is working: 
for example, in Rorty’s response, the novel enlarges human 
sensitivity to suffering and cruelty (which is, incidentally, a peculiar, 
liberal-pragmatic reduction of the multiple richness of literary 
qualities and benefits, including e.g. a lack of any benefit at all). 
Here a question arises of whether Rorty is interested in literature 
as literature or perhaps as a better, more effective tool than -  for 
instance -  philosophy? So, is not Rorty’s writing about literature 
instrumental with respect to it in that what is perhaps at stake is 
merely juxtaposing it to philosophy? That is, showing what 
post-Philosophical philosophy ought to be, or might be, by means 
of idealizing, drawing artificial contours, and even caricaturing 
literature and, in broader terms, the so-called highbrow literary 
culture. Today’s "supremacy of literary culture"20, placing 
literature in the center of culture and treating both science and 
philosophy as literary genres (as did the philosophers he 
described as "textualists") may result from Rorty’s new ideal, new 
pattern to be followed (once the sciences -  in philosophy and in
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19 Richard Rorty, CP, p. 148.
20 Ibidem, p. 150.
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culture -  are not that ideal any more). That can be testified by the 
way in which he accounts for the work of the literary critic -  as 
strong misreading. What is the way of reading texts in literary 
criticism and in literature according to him? Rorty sees here so 
accepted lack of a method, of general, ahistorical and permanent 
criteria of evaluation, he admires the self-creational possibilities of 
literary criticism (imposing one’s own vocabulary on someone 
else’s text, redescription carried out in one’s own terms rather than 
in terms of a given text or inherited ones). Another question -  is 
not Rorty producing for his own pragmatic needs such a picture of 
literary criticism that suits him, on the basis of e.g. philosophical 
conceptions or their application (Derrida and Harold Bloom). 
Literary criticism would be an outlet for self-creational desires of 
the critic or the philosopher. The text would serve only the critic’s 
own aims -  Rorty’s "method" shown following Harold Bloom might 
be as follows: the critic shapes the text for his own needs imposing 
to it a vocabulary which "may have nothing to do with any 
vocabulary used in the text or by its author, and seeing what 
happens"21 2 23Rorty applies that "method" -  and admits it explicitly 
- in his discussions of Derrida. When Jacques Bouveresse (in a 
congenial volume of texts on Rorty and his responses: Lire Rorty. 
Le pragmatisme et ses conséquences) reproaches him that he 
makes the Derrida he needs, Rorty answers that he takes from 
him whatever he wants, rejecting what is left. He uses him as a 
grain to be ground in his own mill (comme le blé pour mon propre 
moulin) 23 And he gets the right for it from the fact of bei ng a "strong 
misreader" endowed with the right of his own redescriptions. He 
is rightfully proud that he can, as he puts it, "get more out of the 
text than its author or its intended audience could possibly find 
there".24 Literature replaces philosophy as a "presiding cultural 
discipline", as science in the nineteenth century was replaced with 
philosophy as a secular substitute of religion.
21 See Michael Fischer, "Redefining Philosophy as Literature: Richard Rorty’s 
’Defence’ of Literary Culture" in Reading Rorty, pp. 233-243.
22 Richard Rorty, CP, p. 151.
23 Richard Rorty, "Réponse à Jacques Bouveresse" in Lire Rorty. 
Le pragmatisme et ses conséquences, p. 156.
24 Richard Rorty, CP, p. 152.
In the nineteenth century, the secular intellectual began losing 
faith in science in the same fundamental way as the Enlightenment 
lost its faith in God.25 Philosophy would give the secular 
intellectual his conception of himself. Rorty says that in the 
nineteenth century "’philosophy’ became, for the intellectuals, a 
substitute for religion", namely
[i]t was the area of culture where one touched bottom, 
where one found the vocabulary and the convictions 
which permitted one to explain and justify one’s activity 
as an intellectual, and thus to discover the significance 
of one’s life 26
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In other words, as we have noted right at the beginning - 1 am 
important as a philosopher, because philosophy itself is that 
important... But in the nineteenth century, with the beginning of 
what Rorty calls the culture of the man of letters, that is the culture 
of the "intellectual who wrote poems and novels and political 
treatises, and criticisms of other people’s poems and novels and 
treatises"27, the importance of philosophy began to be doubted. 
Consequently, scientists became isolated at the beginning of the 
twentieth century from the majority of intellectuals, just like 
theologians had been isolated before. Moral teachers of the youth, 
to use favorite Rorty’s formulation, became poets and novelists, 
and the more philosophy wanted to be "scientific" or "exact", the 
more it drifted away from the rest of culture and thereby the more 
absurd in Rorty’s view its traditional claims to being a foundational 
discipline for the whole of culture were. To show the next part of 
philosophical history in one sentence, one can add that it was 
Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Dewey ("the three most important 
philosophers of our century", as Rorty says) who first wanted to 
make philosophy a grounding or foundational discipline according 
to the Kantian ideal, and then broke with that ideal and did 
everything they could to warn philosophers and philosophy against
25 See ibidem, p. 228.
26 Richard Rorty, PMN, p. 4 -  emphasis mine.
27 Ibidem, p. 4.
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succumbing to such temptations; they gave birth to the possibility 
of such a culture in which there is no room left for one, single, 
all-encompassing discipline that legitimates all other disciplines.
Rorty, within a framework of C.P Snow’s dichotomy of the 
"scientific culture" and the "literary culture", seems to place 
philosophizing, togetherwith.forinstance, literary criticism, as well 
as poetry, within the latter culture, with all the consequences of 
that28 Who is that "literary intellectual" or -  in broadest Rortyan 
terms -  "cultural critic" and what is his role in culture? He feels he 
may comment on everything in culture that is going on around him. 
He is a préfiguration of a philosopher of the "post-Philosophical" 
era, he is the one who has abandoned traditional pretensions to 
Philosophy (with the capital "p"). This is his congenial description: 
"He passes rapidly from Hemingway to Proust to Hitler to Marx to 
Foucault to Mary Douglas to the present situation in Southeast 
Asia to Ghandi to Sophocles".29 He is a "name dropper", a master 
in using proper names as sets of descriptions, ways of seeing the 
world. His specializes in searching for similarities and differences 
between big visions, pictures of the world painted in the most 
general lines. Deprived of historical constants, doomed to 
redescriptions of redescriptions ("like Nietzsche, to interpret 
interpretations" -  Derrida), he is doomed to be quickly forgotten. 
Not finding immortal sentences, true statements -  he leaves 
behind merely mortal, ever-changing vocabularies. According to 
Rorty, the "temporalization of rationality" discovered by Hegel in 
his Phenomenology was one of the most significant steps on the 
road to pragmatic incredulity towards -  atemporal and ahistorical 
-  Philosophy.30 31
Rorty’s answer to the question about philosophy and literature, 
while convincing, is perhaps too simple, similarl to the one given 
by Zygmunt Bauman in Intimations of P o s tm o d e rn ^ : namely, 
philosophy and literature in the past (when the former was still
28 See Thomas McCarthy, ''Ironie privée et décence publique", in Lire Rorty, 
p. 91.
29 Richard Rorty, CP, p. xl.
30 Ibidem, p. xli.
31 See Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity, p. 215.
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Philosophy) would stand on the opposite sides of the dichotomy, 
they were pa rad igm a tic  cases of the o ppos itions : 
subjective/objective, rational/irrational, scientific/non-scientific, 
doxaJepisteme i.e. opinion and knowledge, contingent/universal, 
historical/ahistorical etc. (and still earlier the opposition of logos 
and mythos, that is to say, philosophers and poets). Nowadays - 
if one were to abandon the traditional account of truth, objectivity, 
rationality -  philosophy would not stand on the side of the 
objective, the rational, the atemporal etc. One part of the 
dichotomy would have to disappear, and together with the 
dichotomy itself would share its fate. So what would separate 
philosophy and literature today? The common answer of the two 
thinkers would be: different books, different traditions, finally, 
different history, for philosophy, like literature, cannot escape from 
its history and historicity, although it is sometimes difficult to 
remember that also e.g. the philosophy of Rorty himself is just a 
contingent product of liberal American culture of the end of the 
twentieth century. It so happened, but it could have happened in 
a quite different way. In a word, philosophy today can dare only 
what Hegel so beautifully called "grasping one’s time in thought".
And then both philosophy and literature see the present (and 
the past) in their contingent vocabularies, endowed with different 
degree of sensitivity, embedded in different conceptuality shaped 
by their respective histories. In a different style, one could say 
(referring to Nietzsche, Deleuze, Derrida). But claims of both 
disciplines to be coining a neutral vocabulary (as discovering one 
is totally out of the question) are equally unjustified. What is 
significant is Rorty’s attitude to the practical achievements of both 
spheres of culture. Whose sensitivity to pain was changed by 
traditional philosophy, did it manage to change the world to the 
better? Literature has its successes -  Rorty advises us to compare 
the role played by novelists and literary critics in creating liberal 
democracies in the Western world with the rather insignificant one 
played by philosophers.32
If one assumes all Rorty’s points of departure, it may turn out 
that philosophy is merely "a kind of writing" (as he wrote of
32 See e.g. Richard Rorty, "Brigands et intellectuels", p. 486.
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Derrida’s writings in Consequences of Pragmatism). It is most 
difficult to agree with such a seemingly reductionist point to all 
those who see some specific, universal and emancipatory tasks 
for philosophy; to those who seek one, final and unchanging over 
the centuries "philosophical context"- in which one can put, and 
then judge, in front of a philosophical tribunal of reason, all other 
disciplines and all other participants in a cultural conversation 
precisely from a "philosophical point of view". To the question 
whether philosophy may be outdated as a discipline, Rorty will 
answer that "disciplines outlive paradigms that give birth to them". 
For the philosopher who is able to answer the question of an 
inquisitive student "what did Hegel mean", will always be needed. 
The practical problem -  "who will be teaching Hegel" -  guarantees 
the survival of philosophy today, like questions of e.g. Heidegger 
tomorrow, or of a Rorty the day after tomorrow... For who else if 
not the philosopher is able to provide us with that "commentary on 
the details of the tradition" the depth and extent of which 
distinguishes the philosopherfrom "the amateur, the philistine, he30
mystic, or the belletrist".
3.
What is needed now in our discussion is a brief excursus into 
Rorty’s attitude towards the history of philosophy -  for the choice 
of one’s own history of philosophy determines the self-image of 
the philosopher. "The self-image of a philosopher”, Rorty says -  
"his identification of himself as such (rather than as, perhaps, an 
historian or a mathematician or a poet) -  depends almost entirely 
upon how he sees the history of philosophy". The adoption of a 
new vocabulary -  an independent gesture of each philosopher - 
"is motivated almost entirely by a perception of one’s relation to 
the history of philosophy".3 4 The choice: Hegel or Plato, and 
further pragmatism or some fundamentalism -  that is, on the one 
hand, philosophy seen as "one’s time grasped in thought", and on 
the other, "an escape from conversation to something atemporal 
which lies in the background of all possible conversations" -  is
33 Richard Rorty, CP, p. 41.
34 Ibidem, pp. 41,41.
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made simply by reading the history of philosophy and drawing a 
moral.35 A similar attitude to the history of the novel is taken by 
Milan Kundera, one of Rorty’s recent favorites. Perhaps it would 
be easier to understand Rorty’s attitude towards philosophy -  as 
well as his account of the history of philosophy -  by means of 
comparing it with Kundera’s account of the novel and its history 
from The Art of the Novel. Let us add first, though, what binds so 
closely Rorty, Lyotard or Foucault with Kundera: histories, stories, 
micrologies, written narratives. Without developing that theme, for 
there is not enough space for it here, let us use a couple of well 
chosen citations. Kundera says the following: "I am making stories, 
juxtaposing them and that is why and how I ask questions"36 which 
is echoed by Lyotard when he says that he is merely "telling you 
a story, unfolding a little story of my own"37 389and advising to "set to
oo
work forging fictions rather than hypotheses and theories' ; 
Rorty’s response might be the aforementioned sentence about 
telling stories about most and least favored books, and Michel 
Foucault’s agreement might be expressed in the following 
statement: "I am fully aware that I have never written anything 
other than fictions". In other words, as Maurice Blanchot explains 
it, "I am a fabulist composing fables whose morals one would be
O Q
unwise to wait for". (Setting oneself free of various narratives 
may, in the most general terms, be associated with May ’68, that 
Lyotardian "narrative explosion"... and so on, but we cannot 
diverge from the main course taken in this chapter so let us cross 
out, not without regret, the very possibility of Sternian digressions).
Philosophy is a thing devoid of its nature -  its essence, 
endowed only with its history ("Personne ne sait qu’est la 
philosophie, pas plus que Ton ne sait qu’est la poesie ou la 
science", as Rorty will put it in his response to Bouveresse40).
35 Ibidem, p. 174.
36 Milan Kundera in Kundera. Materiały z sympozjum (London: Polonia Book, 
1988), p. 149 (in Polish).
37 Jean-François Lyotard, "Lessons in Paganism" in The Lyotard Reader, 
ed. A. Benjamin (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 125.
38 Ibidem, p. 118.
39 Foucault/Blanchot {New York: Zone Books, 1990), p. 94.
40 Richard Rorty in Lire Rorty, p. 151.
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Kundera writes about the novel as a "sequence of discoveries" -  
and about the "need to answer to no one but Cervantes"41 423and 
Rorty writes about commenting on "the Plato-Kant sequence". 
What does the ironist philosopher do? He is a parasite on 
metaphysics as "the topic of ironist theory is metaphysical 
theory" -  he wants to understand a "metaphysical desire to 
theorize" in order to be able, finally, to get free from it. Ironist 
philosophy remains without a task, an aim, devoid of its telos. It 
does not head towards a settled point (e.g. towards truth) nor does 
it look for roads leading to it. According to Husserl’s Crisis of 
European Sciences and Phenomenology, philosophy was born 
out of the "passion of knowing". The birthplace of spiritual Europe 
(to which, let us add, belongs according to Husserl also North 
America -  but not "Eskimoes, Indians, travelling zoos or gypsies 
permanently wandering all over Europe", of which Derrida reminds 
us in his Of S p irit3) was ancient Greece of the seventh and sixth 
centuries BC, and it was there that a theoretical attitude appeared 
for the first time: "man becomes there a non-enaaged observer, 
he looks at the world, becoming a philosopher"44̂ The "passion of 
knowing" in question, located by Husserl in Greece, lies at the 
origins of philosophy, it also gave rise to the novel, although after 
many centuries, in Cervantes, Fielding or Richardson. With 
Cervantes, the new European art began to indulge in deliberations 
on human existence about which, since Descartes and Galileo, 
modern philosophy began to "forget" under the influence of "stray 
rationalism" (Husserl). A novel which does not discover an 
unknown bit of existence is immoral, Kundera will say following 
Hermann Broch. Novels have to "set out on a further conquest of 
being". When they do not discover anything, they do not participate 
in that sequence of discoveries -  in the history of the novel, and
41 Milan Kundera, Art of the Novel (New York: Grove Press, 1986), p. 144.
42 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 96.
43 Jacques Derrida, Of Spirit. Heidegger and the Question (Chicago: Chicago 
UP, 1989), p. 120.
44 Edmund Husserl, Crisis of European Sciences and Phenomenology, a 
Polish translation by J. Sidorek, Kryzys europejskiego człowieczeństwa a 
filozofia (Warsaw: Aletheia, 1993), p. 31.
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when they stand next to it, they fall out of It. They either refer to 
their history -  or are dead.
Rorty seems to want philosophy -  together with the novel and 
similarly to it -  to recognize that the world is ambiguous; that there 
is no single, absolute truth but a multitude of relative and 
contradictory truths. He would like to accept Kundera’s "wisdom 
of the novel" (/a sagesse du roman) which is the "wisdom of 
uncertainty". He is seduced, paradoxically enough, by the 
truthfulness of an ambiguous and relative world that philosophy 
does not want to accept. "The world of a single Truth" is not only 
a totalitarian world, as Kundera presents it. It is also, let us add, 
the world of the traditional philosophy made of a different material 
than the "relative world of the novel". "Totalitarian truth excludes 
relativity, doubts, questions and can never accept what I would call 
the s p ir it of the nove l".45 The m ethod of tru th  of 
epistemologically-oriented, traditional philosophy deriving from 
Kant, of the truth of philosophy as a foundational discipline for the 
rest of culture, is similar. The "wisdom of the novel" seems closer 
to Rorty than the "wisdom of philosophy", if I can put it that way, 
as the former took better care of freedom of the individual -  for it 
is the novel that is a "fascinating imaginary space where no one 
is the owner of truth and where everyone has the right to be 
understood".46 In the face of dangers to (fragile and unstable) 
culture it comes in handy that the "precious essence of the 
European spirit is, like in a silver jewellery box, in the history of the 
novel, in the wisdom of the novel".47 And Rorty, the philosopher, 
the pragmatist, believes in it for he is convinced by his liberal 
opinions and his philosophical views. The wisdom that allowed to 
shape the West in the way it is shaped today (and let us remind 
here of Rorty’s attitude to the USA -  that "best of all possible 
w orlds"- and American culture, so different from that of 
catastrophists of Marxist postmodernism or of a Baudrillard from 
Amérique who says with a scorn: Les Etats-Unis, c ’est l ’utopie
45 Milan Kundera, Art of the Novel, a Polish translation by M. Biericzyk 
(Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1991), p. 19.
46 Ibidem, p. 130.
47 Ibidem, p. 130.
202 Rorty and literature
réalisée, but so full of concern for the future) did not come from 
philosophers, nor was it defended by philosophers. It was mainly 
done according to Rorty by literary imagination, the writers’
4ftsensitivity and their loud voice, giver, to them temporarily only , 
incidentally, by the project of modernity that may be coming to its 
completion.
4.
It is not the point that the philosopher has to write about 
literature, the point may be that he re-thinks the very knot of 
relations between philosophy and literature. It is sometimes not in 
investigating how philosophy approaches its "object" and 
"sharpens" its philosophical "tools" (Hegel) that lies at the heart of 
the question; it may also lie in relations the two retain with each 
other. In Jacques Derrida deconstruction is an intended re-thinking 
of the two domains at the same time. Is Rorty’s project similar to 
Derrida’s? Or perhaps it is manifestly philosophical, instrumentally 
making use of literature for Rorty’s pragmatic needs (e.g. for the 
devalorization and denigration of Philosophy with the capital "p")? 
It may be worth noting that the attitude of Zygmunt Bauman to 
literature is similar -  he does not investigate today’s blurring of 
boundaries, the merging of the two genres, but uses the literary 
genre as an example, as a case from history described by the pen 
of a man of letters, as an object of a sociological deliberations (se 
e.g. Kafka and his Diaries as described in Modernity and 
Ambivalence). Derrida is different -  his aim -  as Positions explain 
-  is to "deconstruct practically the philosophical opposition 
between philosophy and myth, between logos and mythos" which 
can be done only textually, with the help of an "other writing", 
neither "philosophical", nor "literary"48 9 Deconstruction of the 
opposition between philosophy and literature gives birth to a
48 See Marek Kwiek, Rorty and Lyotard. In the Labyrinths of Postmodernity 
(in Polish), especially "Introduction". See also Jean-François Lyotard, Tombeau 
de l ’Intellectuel et autres papiers (Paris: Galilée, 1984), pp. 9-23.
49 Jacques Derrida, Positions (London: The Athlone Press, 1987), pp. 53,53,
71.
Rorty and literature 203
metaphilosophical (for the very opposition is philosophical) or a 
no-longer-philosophical undertaking.
Rorty does not hide his intentions towards literature. He 
exposes its past, present and future to a simple test -  to the 
question of its utility, benefits that can be derived for developing 
liberal democracies. (He admits it explicitly in his polemic with 
Umberto Eco when he says that he imposes on each book his own 
"grid" which is the narrative of "the pragmatist’s progress"50). So 
he opposes, for instance, the public uselessness of Heidegger’s 
philosophy -  and the public benefits deriving from reading 
Dickens’ novels, confronting a philosophical theory with a literary 
narrative. The novel turned out in his view to have been more 
fruitful than philosophy in the history of social transformations of 
modern West, which is to say that "when you weigh the good and 
the bad the social novelists have done against the good and the 
bad the social theorists have done, you find yourself wishing that 
there had been more novels and fewer theories".51 It is thanks to 
novels that the West has worked out an "increased ability to 
tolerate diversity" -  by means of realization of and sensitivity to 
intolerance, which the West owes more to "our novelists than to 
our philosophers or to our poets".52 As within the Heidegger -  
Dickens opposition (that is, a taste for "theory, simplicity, structure, 
abstraction, and essence" on the one hand, and a taste for 
"narrative, detail, diversity, and accident" on the other53) Rorty 
sides with Dickens, similarly in the Heidegger -  Proust opposition 
outlined in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, that is in an already 
smaller group of "ironist" writers and theoreticians, Rorty decidedly 
sides with Proust. The choice in the latter case is between 
"self-creation" and "affiliation” (to greater powers than that of the 
one who writes). Let us try to outline briefly the opposition between 
ironist theoreticians (such as Heidegger, but also Hegel and 
Nietzsche) and ironist writers.
50 Richard Rorty, "The Pragmatist’s Progress" in Umberto Eco, Interpretation 
and Overinterpretation (Cambridge: CUP, 1992), p. 91.
51 Richard Rorty, "Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens" in PP 2, p. 80.
62 Ibidem, p. 81.
53 Ibidem, p. 73.
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Perhaps the single most important approximation will be seen 
in Rorty’s introductory statement that for ironists theory has 
become "a means to private perfection" -  rather than a tool for 
social communication.54 Thus we are on the one side of the 
opposition between the private and the public, fundamental to 
Rorty, within which there appears still another opposition: ironist 
writers who are fully private and ironist theorists who do not totally 
abandon their public mission (despite socially being totally 
"useless"). The former writers -  like Proust -  remain in their 
writings in relation to their own, private, idiosyncratic past; they 
reconfigure objects, people and events once again (using, for 
instance, that mémoire involontaire), making redescriptions of 
their surrounding in their own vocabulary, in their own terms. They 
aim at autonomy (precisely, auto and nomos, as opposed in a 
Kantian manner to heteronomy, foreign laws, "foreign 
governance") redescribing in their works those who once 
described themselves. They break free from external authorities, 
showing their relativity, finiteness, transitoriness.
Ironist theorists, on the other hand, still keep vestiges of public 
ambitions. They write about Europe, the march of the Spirit or 
Being, they invent -  as Rorty puts it -  "a larger-than-self hero"55 
They want to remain in relation to the past which is broader than 
their own -  preferably to the past of a species, race or class. They 
are not content with merely ordering small things in their own way 
(details, accidents, narratives etc.) -  they want to describe also a 
big and important thing, drawing their power from it. They prefer, 
to sum up, affiliation to self-creation. What is disharmonious in their 
works is their (immodest) feeling of their superiority as 
philosophers coming from the belief that it cannot be by any means 
the case that certain beloved, philosophical words -  words like 
"Aristotle", "physis" or "Parmenides", to Heidegger -  are nothing 
more but their private counterparts of other words beloved by 
others (far more numerous, incidentally), such as "Combray" or 
"Gilbert" from Remembrance of the Things Past. "Proust 
succeeded because he had no public ambitions -  no reason to
54 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 96.
55 Ibidem, p. 100.
Rorty and literature 205
believe that the sound of the name ’Guermantes’ would mean 
anything to anybody but his narrator". And he adds that "Heidegger 
thought he knew some words which had, or should have had, 
resonance for everybody in modern Europe, words which were 
relevant not just to the fate of people who happen to have read a 
lot of philosophy books but to the public fate of the H/esf'.56 But 
as a matter of fact these are merely -  not endowed with different 
significance from other words -  private sets of (favorite) words. 
Europe and its fate do not depend more on a list of books read by 
Heidegger or on any other list of any other books, Rorty comments. 
When one contrasts Nietzsche’s or Heidegger’s ironist theorizing 
with the modern novel, it turns out that the former is just "one of 
great literary traditions" -  possibly comparable to the novel if we 
take into consideration its achievements, but much less significant 
if we take into account its influence on politics, social hopes and 
solidarity.57
As Kundera tries to show, the novel has invented its own -  
imaginary -  democratic utopia. It is as if a future society in which 
nobody dreams of thinking that God, Truth or the Nature of Things 
is on his side. In such a utopia nobody would dream of thinking 
that there is something more real than pleasure or pain. 
Democratic utopia would be a community in which the most 
important virtues of mind would be tolerance and curiosity -  rather 
than seeking truth.58 59In such a Utopia people would suffer from 
and cause much less pain than they do today, it would be a utopia 
of brotherhood realized in many currently unimaginable ways. 
"The unifying social ideal of this utopia would be a balance 
between the minimizing of suffering and the maximizing of 
rationality3 [= tolerance] -  a balance between pressure not to hurt 
others and tolerance of different ways of living, between vigilance 
against cruelty and reluctance to set up a panoptic s ta te ".9
56 Ibidem, p. 118 -  emphasis mine.
57 Ibidem, p. 120.
58 Richard Rorty, "Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens", p. 75.
59 Richard Rorty, "A Pragmatist View of Rationality and Cultural Difference", 
Philosophy East and West, vol. 42, no. 4, October 1992, p. 587.
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Thus, as a matter of fact, Rorty writes of such writers and such 
literature which is (or in his reading can be) socially -  not even only 
individually, self-creationally -  useful. For even when he writes of 
Nabokov -  and he does that in an absolutely superb manner -  he 
does it in order to show that although Nabokov was a writer aiming 
at autonomy (self-creation), nevertheless he studied cruelty 
inherently included in search for that autonomy. So, paradoxically 
as it seems, Orwell and Nabokov get closer and closer to each 
other in Rorty’s reading -  for, as he puts it, "both of them warn the 
liberal ironist intellectual against temptations to be cruel"60 And 
the fear of causing pain, of being cruel, constitutes in his view the 
liberal sensitivity.
Let us say, somehow on the margin of the text, a couple of 
words about French postmodern thought: their engaging in 
discussions of (non-representational) literature was a wholly 
critical undertaking. French culture resisted the representational 
paradigm -  so philosophers started to deal with "literature of 
illegibility" (Sollers) or "opaque speech" (Foucault). Since 
Mallarmé, literature has no longer wanted to reflect the world, to 
be "a copy of a copy", to stand on the other end than the world 
itself. It wants instead to become a full part of that world and not 
merely a mirror of nature. The language of literature does not want 
to represent the reality -  there appears the awareness of a 
"fundamental inadequacy" (as Barthes says in his inaugural 
Leçon) between the linguistic order and that of the world; the 
category of representation becomes a banner-like object of a 
critical investigation -  and rejection -  in the French humanities of 
recent decades. The myth of mimesis that has constituted art 
(together with literature) since ancient Greece, is violently 
questioned in works of Bataille or Artaud -  and of their post-war 
commentators. Rorty’s thinking of literature is of a completely 
different nature -  and pertains to a completely different sort of 
literature. It is Dickens and Proust, Nabokov and Orwell, and finally 
Kundera -  but Kundera the literary theorist and essayist, the
5 .
60 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 144.
author of Art of the Novel rather than as the author of his novels. 
That is, to be sure, a philosophical (to be more precise: pragmatic) 
choice on Rorty’s part -  i.e. "details" and "cruelty", the concern for 
pain hidden under the mask of aestheticism, as well as moral 
protest-and the "depreciated legacy of Cervantes" as an instance 
in the face of which one accounts for one’s writing. Obviously, both 
philosophy and literature may be just literary genres, two kinds of 
writing; Rorty never said that philosophy is literature -  they are 
separated by an abyss of, first of all, tradition and history, that is, 
on the one hand one has Father Parmenides, on the other Father 
Cervantes, on the one Kant and on the other Flaubert etc. etc. 
Philosophy can be seen as a "family romance"61, philosophers -  
as commentators on certain past writers (usually).
In Rorty’s account of literature, one can focus on the importance 
of attempts to blur the traditional opposition: the moral and the 
aesthetic (that is, by way of an example, literature with a "moral 
message" and literature that is "merely aesthetic"). Rorty in 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity draws a distinction between 
books that help readers to become autonomous subjects and 
books that help them to become less cruel. Among the latters -  
those referring to cruelty ratherthantoautonomy-thereare books 
treating of the influence of practices and social institutions on other 
people and those pertaining to the influence of our personal 
idiosyncrasies on others. Instead of the traditional distinction 
between "moralists" and "aesthetes", Rorty suggests the basic 
question to determine a genre of a given work: "whatpurposes 
does this book serve?".62 The purposes taken into consideration 
are not the good and the beautiful, but either maintaining an old, 
existing final vocabulary or working out of a new final vocabulary 
(there seem to be here remote analogies to Kuhnian "normal 
science" and "revolutionary science"). Books that transform a final 
vocabulary form a tiny but perhaps the most important part of all - 
they can transform more. It is to them that Rorty applies his 
private-public distinction. He says namely that there belong books 
which
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61 Richard Rorty, CP, p. 92.
62 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 142.
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aimed at working out a new private final vocabulary and 
those aimed at working out a new puMcfinal vocabulary.
The former is a vocabulary deployed to answer 
questions like "What shall I be?" "What can I become?" 
"What have I been?" The latter is a vocabulary deployed 
to answer the question "What sorts of things about what 
sorts of people do I need to notice?"63
Let us remind ourselves here: there is no "nature of literature", 
Rorty stresses. The aim of some writers (Plato, Heidegger, Proust, 
Nabokov) is search for "private perfection", the aim of other writers 
(Dickens, Mill, Dewey, Orwell, Habermas, Rawls) is serving 
"human freedom". They cannot be evaluated on a common scale, 
by making some inferior, or superior, to others. Just like there is 
no "aim of writing", there is also no "aim of theorizing".64 It does 
not lead anywhere to contrast both kinds of "writers" (rather than 
philosophers and writers, let us add) with each other -  as, for 
instance, writers of "self-creation" and those of "solidarity", as 
there is no higher, synthesizing account that could grasp 
self-creation and justice, private perfection and solidarity, in a 
single view. It was precisely looking for such a "synoptic vision" -  
such a single account -  that first brought about and then directed 
Rorty’s interest in philosophy. How is one to make one’s "Trotsky" 
and one’s "wild orchids" agree, he would ask in a autobiographical 
text, how is one to be at the same time a "friend of humanity" and 
an "intellectual and spiritual snob“.65The answer to that pervading 
question is brought no sooner than in Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity, for it was still in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature that 
this question fundamental to Rorty’s thought was untouched 
(although there are already in it many themes forecasting such a 
solution to the problem66). The answer Rorty gives at the same 
time denies philosophy the hope of reaching such an account, 
such a vision (being impossible on the level of theory) stating that
63 Ibidem, p. 143.
64 Ibidem, p. 141.
65 Richard Rorty, "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids”, p. 143.
66 See prefiguartions of "self-creational" themes in PMN, e.g. pp. 359-360.
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the vocabulary of self-creation is private, non-shared and 
Incompatible with argumentation, whereas the vocabulary of 
justice is public and common, is a means serving precisely to 
argumentation. These two vocabularies, like aims that the 
aforementioned two kinds of writers have in common, as well as 
requirements of self-creation and solidarity, are "equally valid, yet 
forever incommensurable", in his memorable expression.67 
Between the private and the public there seems to be no 
opposition, there is a tension instead -  and incommensurability.
Coming to an end of this little story, let us say that literature 
(and the novel in particular) has a settled position in Rorty’s 
philosophical conceptions: in the face of the powerlessness of 
Continental philosophy on the one hand and a cultural demise of 
analytic philosophy on the other; in the face of a restricted influence 
of philosophy as such on the delicate issues of social life in the 
times of collapse of a traditional Enlightenment figure of the 
intellectual -  the chance, perhaps the last one, of shaping liberal 
sensitivity is provided by the novel (and let us bear in mind that we 
belong to culture that was not only nourished by the "Bible, 
Socrates, Plato, and the Enlightenment" but also, as Rorty says, 
by "Rabelais, Montaigne, Sterne, Hogarth and Mark Twain")68 69
That may be the reason for which Rorty invests all his "pragmatic" 
hopes in literature, leaving philosophy with a role of advising or of 
"Romantic" (in the opposition suggested here) individual 
self-creation. Thereby he replaces a critical and yet softened tooth 
of philosophical thinking (partially saved in Lyotard -  e.g. in his 
idea of the "resistance through writing" or "bearing witness to 
différends" from The Différend, or in the late Foucault -  e.g. in his 
texts on Kant and the Enlightenment70, or in Derrida -  in the form 
of transcending both philosophy and literature in order to 
deconstruct their philosophical opposition by means of particular
67 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. xv.
68 Richard Rorty in Lire Rorty, p. 184.
69 Jean-François Lyotard, "An Interview", Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 5 
(1988), p. 302.
70 Michel Foucault, "Qu’est-ce que les Lumières?", Magazine littéraire, No 
309, Avril 1993, pp. 63-73; Michel Foucault, "The Art of Telling the Truth" in 
Politics, Philosophy, Culture, L.D. Kritzman (ed.), pp. 86-95.
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"acts of reading") -  with the sharpened and newly valued tooth of 
the novelist. Nevertheless, his general perspective is rather 
pessimistic: intellectuals cannot do much today -  from among 
them perhaps writers are most needed by liberal society. And the 
philosopher, well, let he just advise others at the moment that it is 
important to read novels...
Bibliography:
Arendt, Hannah, The Life of the Mind: 1. Thinking, New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovivh, 1977.
Arendt, Hannah, Between Past and Future. Eight Exercises in 
Political Thought, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovivh, 1954.
Besnier, Jean-Michel, La politique de l ’impossible, Paris: La 
Découverte, 1988.
Balslev, Anindita N, Cultural Otherness. Correspondence with 
Richard Rorty, New Delhi: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 
1991.
Bataille, Georges, Visions o f Excess. Selected Writings 
1927-1939, tr. Allan Stoekl, Manchester: Manchester UP, 1985.
Bataille, Georges, On Nietzsche, tr. B. Boone, New York: Paragon 
House, 1992.
Bataille, Georges, Inner Experience, tr. L.A. Boldt, New York: 
SUNY Press, 1988.
Barthes, Roland, "Authors and Writers" in A Barthes Reader, 
S. Sontag (ed.), New York: The Noonday Press, 1982.
Baudrillard, Jean, Amérique, Paris: Le livre de poche, 1988.
Baudrillard, Jean, The Transparence of Evil. Essays on Extreme 
Phenomena, tr. J. Benedict, London: Verso, 1993.
Baudrillard, Jean, Selected Writings, (ed. Mark Poster), 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992.
Bauman, Zygmunt, Freedom, London: Open University Press, 
1988.
Bauman, Zygmunt, Legislators and Interpreters. On Modernity, 
Post-Modernity and Intellectuals, Oxford: Polity Press, 1987.
Bauman, Zygmunt, Intimations of Postmodernity, Routledge, 
London, 1992.
Bauman, Zygmunt, Modernity and Ambivalence, Oxford: Polity 
Press, 1991.
Bauman, Zygmunt, Mortality, Immortality and Other Life 
Strategies, Oxford: Polity Press, 1992.
Bauman, Zygmunt, Modernity and the Holocaust, Oxford: Polity 
Press, 1989.
Bauman, Zygmunt, Life in Fragments. Essays in Postmodern 
Morality, Oxford: Blackwell, 1985.
Bauman, Zygmunt, Postmodern Ethics, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
290 Bibliography
Bauman, Zygmunt, Dwa szkice o moralnosci ponowoczesnej 
[Two essays on postmodern morality], Warsaw: Instytut 
Kultury, 1994.
Baynes, Keneth (et al.), Philosophy. End or Transformation?, 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987.
Behler, Ernst, Confrontations. Derrida/Heidegger/Nietzsche, 
Stanford: Stanford UP, 1991.
Beiser, Frederick, "Hegel’s Historicism" in The Cambridge 
Companion to Hegel(ed. by F.Beiser), Cambridge: CUP, 1993, 
pp. 270-300.
Bennington, Geoffrey, Lyotard. Writing the Event, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1988.
Bernstein, Richard, The New Constellation, Cambridge: the MIT 
Press, 1989.
Blanchot, Maurice & Foucault, Michel, Michel Foucault as I 
Imagine Him & Maurice Blanchot: The Thought from Outside, 
tr. J. Mehlman and B. Massumi, New York: Zone Books, 1990.
Bloom, Harold, The Anxiety of Influence, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1973.
Borradori, Giovanna, The American Philosopher. Conversations 
with Quine, Davidson, Putnam, Nozick, Danto, Rorty, Cavell, 
MacIntyre and Kuhn, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1994.
Bouveresse, Jacques, "Sur Quelque conséquences indésirable 
du pragmatisme" in Lire Rorty, Cometti, Jean-Pierre (éd.), 
pp.19-56.
Carroll, David, Paraesthetics. Foucault. Lyotard. Derrida. New 
York and London: Methuen, 1986.
C o lli, G io rg io , Narodziny filozofii, tr. S. K asprzys iak , 
Warsaw-Cracow: Res Publica & Oficyna Literacka, 1991.
Cometti, Jean-Pierre, (éd.), Lire Rorty. Le pragmatisme et ses 
conséquences, Paris: I’ éclat, 1992.
C u tro fe llo , Andrew , D isc ip lin e  and C ritique . Kant, 
Poststructuralism and the Problem of Resistance, New York: 
SUNY Press, 1994.
Davidson, Arnold I., "Archeology, Genealogy, Ethics" in Foucault: 
A Critical Reader, Hoy, David Couzens (ed.), pp. 221-234.
Deleuze, Gilles, Nietzsche, sa vie, son oeuvre, Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1965.
Bibliography 291
Deleuze, Gilles, Nietzsche and Philosophy, tr. H.Tomlison and B. 
Habberjam, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983.
Deleuze, Gilles & Guattari, Félix, Kafka. Pour une littérature 
mineure, Paris: Minuit, 1975.
Derrida, Jacques, Positions, tr. Alan Bass, London: Athlone Press, 
1987.
Derrida, Jacques, Limited Inc., tr. Samuel Weber, Evanston: 
Northwestern UP, 1988.
Derrida, Jacques, The Other Heading. Reflections on Today’s 
Europe, tr. P.A. Brault and M. Naas, Bloomington: Indiana UP, 
1992.
Derrida, Jacques, Of Spirit. Heidegger and the Question, tr. 
G. Bennington and R. Bowlby, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1989.
Derrida, Jacques, The Post Card. From Socrates to Freud and 
Beyond, tr. by Alan Bass, The University of Chicago Press, 
1987.
Derrida, Jacques, Acts of Literature (ed. D. Attridge), London: 
Routledge, 1992.
Derrida, Jacques, Specters of Marx. The State of the Debt, the 
Work of Mourning, and the New International, tr. Peggy Kamuf, 
New York: Routledge, 1994.
Derrida, Jacques, Writing and Difference, tr. Alan Bass, Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1978.
Derrida, Jacques, "Like the Sound of the Sea Deep Withina Shell: 
Paul de Man’s War" (tr. P. Kamuf) in Responses. On Paul de 
man’s Wartime Journalism (ed. by W. Harnacher, N. Hertz, Th. 
Keenan), Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989.
Derrida, Jacques, "Une ’folie’ doit veiller sur la pensée" in 
Magazine littéraire, No 286, Mars 1991, pp. 18-30.
Derrida, Jacques, "Heidegger, the Philosopher’s Hell" in Points... 
Interviews, 1974-1994, E. Weber (ed.), tr. P. Kamuf and others, 
Stanford: Stanford UP, 1995.
Descombes, Vincent, Modern French Philosophy, tr. L. Scott-Fox 
and J.M. Harding, Cambridge: CUP, 1980.
Descombes, Vincent, "’Something different’" in Lire Rorty. Le 
pragmatisme et ses conséquences, (éd. par J.-P. Cometti), 
pp. 57-76.
292 Bibliography
Dews, Peter, Logics of Disintegration. Post-Structuralist Thought 
and the Claims of Critical Theory, London: Verso, 1987.
Drury, Shadia B., Alexandre Kojève. The Roots of Postmodern 
Politics, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994.
During, Simon, Foucault and Literature. Towards a Genealogy of 
Writing, London: Routledge, 1992.
Eco, Umberto (with R. Rorty, J. Culler and Ch. Brooke-Rose; ed. 
S. Collini), Interpretation and Overinterpretation, Cambridge: 
CUP, 1992.
Eribon, Didier, Michel Foucault, tr. Betsy Wing, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1991.
Eribon, Didier, Michel Foucault and ses contemporains, Paris: 
Fayard, 1994.
Farrell, Frank, Subjectivity, Realism, and Postmodernism -  the 
Recovery of the World, Cambridge: CUP, 1994.
Ferry, Luc, and Renaut, Alain, French Philosophy of the Sixties, 
tr. M.H.S. Cattani, Amherst: The University of Massachusets 
Press, 1990.
Foster, Hal, (ed.) The Postmodern Culture, London: Pluto Press, 
1985.
Foucault, Michel, Dits et écrits 1954-1988, vols. I-IV, Paris: 
Gallimard, 1994.
Foucault, M ichel, Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison. 
tr. by A. Sheridan, Penguin Books, 1977.
Foucault, Michel, The History of Sexuality. An Introduction, 
tr. Robert Hurley, New York: Vintage Books, 1978.
Foucault, Michel , Politics, Philosophy, Culture. Interviews and 
Other Writings 1977-1984, (ed. L. Kritzman) London: 
Routledge, 1988.
Foucault, Michel, The Foucault Reader, (ed. P. Rabinow), New 
York: Pantheon, 1984.
Foucault, Michel, Power/Knowledge, Brighton: Harvester, 1980.
Foucault, Michel, "Qu’est-ce que les Lumières?", Magazine 
littéraire, No 309, Avril 1993.
Foucault, Michel, "Preface" to G. Deleuze & F. Guattari, 
Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Minneapolis: 
Minnesota UP, 1983.
Foucault, Michel, "What is an Author?" in Modern Criticism and 
Theory, Lodge, David (ed.), pp.197-210.
Bibliography 293
Foucault, Michel, "Le philosophe masqué" in Entretiens avec Le 
Monde, Paris: La Découverte, 1984, pp. 21-30.
Foucault, Michel, "Truth, Power, Self" in Technologies of the Self. 
A Seminar with Michel Foucault, (ed. by L. H. Martin et al), 
Amherst: The University of Massachusets Press, 1988, pp. 
16-49.
Foucault, Michel, "The Ethic of Care of the Self as a Practice of 
Freedom" in The Final Foucault, (ed. J. Bernauer and 
D. Rasmussen), Cambridge: the MIT Press, 1988, pp. 1-21.
Foucault, Michel, "Intellectuals and Power" in Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice, D. F. Bouchard (ed.), Ithaca: 
Cornell UP, 1977.
Foucaul, Michel, "A Preface to Transgression" in Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice, op. cit.
Foucault, Michel, "The Discourse on Language", appendix to 
Archeology of Knowledge, New York: Pantheon, 1972.
Fraser, Nancy, "Solidarity or Singularity? Richard Rorty Between 
Romanticism and Technocracy" in A. Małachowski (ed.), op.cit, 
pp. 303-321.
Haber, Honi Fern, Beyond Postmodern Politics. Lyotard, Rorty, 
Foucault, London: Routledge, 1994.
Habermas, Jürgen, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, 
tr. F. Lawrence, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987.
Habermas, Jürgen, "Martin Heidegger: On the Publication of the 
Lectures of 1935" in The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical 
Reader, ed. by Richard Wolin, New York: Columbia UP, 1991, 
pp. 186-197.
Habermas, Jürgen, "Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present" in 
Foucault: A Critical Reader, David Couzens Hoy (ed.), 
pp.103-106.
Habermas, Jürgen, "Life Forms, Morality and the Task of the 
Philosopher" in Autonomy and Solidarity. Interviews, P. Dews 
(ed.), London: Verso, 1986, pp. 191-216.
Hadot, P ierre, Filozofia jako ćwiczenie duchowe, tłum . 
P. Domański, W-wa: IFiS PAN, 1992.
Hall, David L., Richard Rorty. Prophet and Poet of the New 
Pragmatism, New York: SUNY Press, 1994.
294 Bibliography
Hart, C arro ll Guen, Grounding Without Foundations. A 
Conversation Between Richard Rorty and John Dewey to 
Ascertain Their Kinship, Toronto: the Patmost Press, 1993.
Hegel, G. W. F., Fenomenologia ducha, tr. A. Landman, vol. I, 
Warsaw: PWN 1964.
Hegel, G.W.F., Zasady filozofii prawa, Warsaw: PWN, 1969.
Heidegger dzisiaj, P. Marciszuk, C. Wodziński (red.), Warsaw: 
Aletheia, 1991.
Holub, Robert C., Jürgen Habermas. Critic in the Public Sphere, 
London: Routledge, 1991.
Hottois, G, Weyembergh, M (eds.), Richard Rorty. Ambiguités et 
limites du postmodernisme, Paris: Vrin, 1994.
House, D. Vaden, Without God or His Doubles. Realism, 
Relativism and Rorty, Leiden -  New York: E. J. Brill, 1994.
Hoy, David Couzens (ed.), Foucault. A Critical Reader, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1986.
Jamroziakowa, Anna (ed.) Inspiracje postmodernistyczne w 
humanistyce (13 tom Poznańskich Studiów z Filozofii Nauki), 
Warsaw-Poznań: PWN, 1993.
Jay, Martin, "In the Empire of the Gaze: Foucault and the 
Denigration of Vision in the Twentith-Century French Thought" 
in Foucault: A Critical Reader, op.cit, pp. 175-204.
Jay, Martin, Downcast Eyes. The Denigration of Vision in 
Twentieth-Century French Thought, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1994.
Jay, Martin, "The Limits of Limit-Experience" in Constellations, vol. 
2, No 2, 1995.
Kant, Immanuel, "Co to jest Oświecenie?" In Kant, T. Kroński, 
Myśli i Ludzie.
Klossowski, Pierre, Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux, Paris: Mercure 
de France, 1969.
Kmita, Jerzy, Pałubicka, Anna, "Problem użyteczności pojęcia 
dośw iadczen ia " in P oszukiw an ie  pew nośc i i je g o  
postmodernistyczna dyskwalifikacja, J. Such (ed.), IF UAM, 
Poznań 1992.
Kmita, Jerzy, "O filozofii i kulturze postmodernistycznej", 
Viel,o,sophie, Poznań, 2/4/90-1/5/91.
Bibliography 295
Kojève, Alexandre Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Lectures 
on the ’Phenomenology of Spirit’, Allan Bloom (ed.), Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1980.
Kolenda, Konstantin, Rorty’s Humanistic Pragmatism. Philosophy 
Democratized, Tampa: University of South Florida Press, 1990. 
Kubicki, Roman, Zmierzch sztuki. Narodziny ponowoczesnej 
jednostki?, Poznan: Wyd. Humaniora, 1995.
Kundera, Milan, The Art of the Novel, New York: Grove Press, 
1986.
Kundera, Milan, Les Testaments trahis, Paris: Gallimard, 1993. 
Kwiek, Marek, Rorty i Lyotard. W labiryntach postmoderny, 
Poznan: IF UAM, 1994.
Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe, Heidegger, Art, and Politics. The 
Fiction of the Political, tr. Ch. Turner, Oxford: Blackwell, 1990. 
Lehman, David, Signs of the Times. Deconstruction and the Fall 
of Paul de Man. New York: Poseidon Press, 1991.
Lévy, Bernard-Henri, Les Aventures de la liberté. Une histoire 
subjective des intellectuels, Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1991. 
Lodge, David (ed.), Modem Criticism and Theory, London: 
Longman, 1988.
Lyotard, Jean-François, The Postmodern Condition. Report on 
Knowledge, tr. B. Massum/, Manchester University Press,
1984.
Lyotard, Jean-François, The Lyotard Reader, (ed. by 
A. Benjamin), Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1989.
Lyotard, Jean-François, The Différend. Phrases in Dispute, tr. 
G. van den Abbeele, Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1988.
Lyotard, Jean-François, Libidinal Economy, tr. I.H. Grant, London: 
The Athlone Press, 1993.
Lyotard, Jean-François, Political Writings, tr. B. Readings and K. P.
Geiman, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993. 
Lyotard, Jean-François, Heidegger and "the jews", tr. A. Michel 
and M.S. Roberts, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1991.
Lyotard, Jean-François (with Jean-Loup Thébaud), Just Gaming, 
tr. W. Godzich, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1985.
296 Bibliography
Lyotard, Jean-François, "Un partenaire bizarre" in Moralités 
postmodernes, Paris: Galilée,1993.
Lyotard, Jean-François, Pérégrinations. Loi, forme, événement 
(trad, par J.-F. Lyotard), Paris: Galilée, 1990.
Lyotard, Jean-François, Tombeau de l ’intellectuel et autres 
papiers, Paris: Galilée, 1984.
Lyotard, Jean-François, Heidegger et "les juifs". Conférence a 
Vien et Freiburg, Wien: Passagen, 1990.
Lyotard, Jean-François, "L’Europe, les juifs et le livre" in Esprit, 
Juin 1990, pp. 113-118.
Lyotard, Jean-François, "Answering the Question: What Is 
Postmodernism?", appendix to The Postmodern Condition, 
op.cit.
Lyotard, Jean-François, "An Interview" (with Reijen and 
Veerman), Theory, Culture and Society, vol. 5 (1988).
Lyotard, Jean-François, "Discussion entre Jean-Francois Lyotard 
et Richard Rorty", Critique, 456, mai 1985.
McCarthy, Thomas, "Ironie privée et décence publique” in 
J.-P. Cometti (ed.), op.cit, pp. 77-100.
Macey, David, The Lives of Michel Foucault, New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1994.
Małachowski, Alan, Reading Rorty. Critical Responses to 
"Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" (and Beyond), New York: 
Blackwell, 1991.
McGowan, John, Postmodernism and Its Critics, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991.
Michelfelder Diane. & Palmer, Richard (eds.), Dialogue & 
Deconstruction. The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter, New York: 
SUNY Press, 1989.
Miller, J. Hillis, "The Critic as Host" in Modern Criticism and Theory, 
op.cit., pp. 278-286.
Michel Foucault. Une histoire de la vérité, Paris: Syros, 1985.
Morawski, Stefan, "Trzy i pół refleksji o filozoficznym  
postmodernizmie" in Czy kryzys wartości?, Lublin 1992 
(J.Mizińska, T.Szkołut, eds.).
Morawski, Stefan, "Komentarz do kwestii postmodernizmu", 
Studia Filozoficzne, 4/1990.
Bibliography 297
Murphy, John P., Pragmatism. From Peirce to Davidson 
(Introduction by Richard Rorty), Boulder: Westview Press, 
1990.
Nancy, Jean-Luc, "Our History", Diacritics, 20.3, Fall 1990.
Nehamas, Alexander, Nietzsche. Life as Literature, Cambridge: 
Harvard UP, 1985.
Nietzsche, Friedrich, "O prawdzie i kłamstwie w pozamoralnym 
sensie", in Pisma pozostałe 1862-1875, tłum. B. Baran, 
Cracow: Inter Esse, 1993.
Norris, Christopher, Deconstruction: Theory & Practice, Methuen, 
London, 1985.
Norris, Christopher, Derrida, London: Fontana, 1987.
Norris, Christopher, What’s Wrong with Postmodernism. Critical 
Theory and the Ends of Philosophy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
UP, 1990.
Norris, Christopher, "Deconstruction, Postmodernism and 
Philosophy: Habermas on Derrida" in Derrida: A Critical 
Reader, David Wood (ed.).
Palmier, Jean-Michel, Hegel. Essai sur la formation du systeme 
hśgelien, Paris: Editions Universitaires, 1968.
Pałubicka, Anna, Kulturowy wymiar świata obiektywnego, Wyd. 
Naukowe UAM, Poznań 1990.
Pałubicka, Anna, "Richarda Rorty’ego koncepcja nauki" in 
Inspiracje postmodernistyczne, A. Jamroziakowa (ed.), op.cit.
Pefanis, Julian, Heterology and the Postmodern. Bataille, 
Baudirllard, and Lyotard, Durham and London: Duke UP, 1991.
Platon, Listy, tłum. M. Maykowska, Warsaw: PWN, 1987.
Platon, Gorgiasz, tłum. W. Witwicki, PWN, 1958.
Platon, Faidros, tłum. L. Regner, Warsaw: PWN, 1993.
Platon, Państwo, tłum. W. Witwicki, Warsaw: Akme, 1991.
Platon. Nowa interpretacja. A. Kijewska i E. Zieliński (red.), Lublin: 
KUL, 1993.
Rachwał, Tadeusz i Sławek, Tadeusz, Maszyna do pisania. O 
dekonstruktywistycznej teorii literatury Jacquesa Derridy, 
Warsaw: "Rój", 1992.
Rajchman, John, Truth and Eros. Foucault, Lacan, and the 
Question of Ethics, London: Routledge, 1991.
Rajchman, John, Michel Foucault. The Freedom of Philosophy, 
New York: Columbia UP, 1985.
Rasmussen, David M., Reading Habermas, Cambridge: 
Blackwell, 1990.
Readings, Bill Introducing Lyotard. Art and Politics, London: 
Routledge, 1991.
Readings, Bill, "Pagans, Perverts or Primitives? Experimental 
Justice in the Empire of Capital" in Judging Lyotard, Andrew 
Benjamin (ed.), London: Routlege, 1991.
Richardson, Michael, Georges Bataille, London: Routledge, 1994.
Rockmore, Tom, Heidegger and French Philosophy, London: 
Routledge, 1995.
Rorty, Richard, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, London: 
Blackwell (first published by Princeton UP, 1979), 1980.
Rorty, Richard, Consequences of Pragmatism, Minneapolis: 
Minnesota University Press, 1982.
Rorty, Richard, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Cambridge 
University Press, 1989.
Rorty, Richard, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth. Philosophical 
Papers, vol. I, Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Rorty, Richard, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical 
Papers, vol. II, Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Rorty, Richard, "Derrida on Language, Being and Abnormal 
Philosophy" in The Journal of Philosophy, November 1977.
Rorty, Richard, "Universality and Truth", a typescript.
Rorty, Richard, "Feminism, Ideology and Deconstruction: A 
Pragmatist View", a typescript.
Rorty, Richard, "Paroxysms and Politics" in Salmagundi, no. 97,
pp .61-68.
Rorty, Richard, "The Pragmatist’s Progress" in U. Eco, 
Interpretation and Overinterpretation, Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, pp. 89-108.
Rorty, Richard, "Intellectuals in Politics: Too Far In? Too Far Out?" 
in Dissent, Fall, 1991.
Rorty, Richard, "What Can You Expect from Anti-Foundational 
Philosophers?: a Reply to Lynn Baker" in Virginia Law Review, 
vol. 78, April 1992, pp. 719-727.




Rorty, Richard, "The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of 
Justice" in Southern California Law Review, vol 63, Sept. 1990,
pp. 1811-1820.
Rorty, Richard, "The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres" 
in Philosophy in History (ed. R. Rorty, J.B. Schneewind, 
Q. Skinner), Cambridge: CUP, 1984.
Rorty, Richard, "Philosophy as a Literary Tradition" in The New 
Leader7~\ (3-17 Oct. 1988), pp. 20-21.
Rorty, Richard, “Taking Philosophy Seriously" in New Republic 
(April 11, 1988), pp.31-34.
Rorty, Richard, "Posties" in London Review of Books (April 3, 
1987), pp. 11-12.
Rorty, Richard, "Signposts Along the Way that Reason Went" in 
London Review of Books (Feb. 16,1984), pp. 5-6.
Rorty, Richard, "The Higher Nominalism in a Nutshell: A Reply to 
Henry Staten" in Critical Inquiry 12 (Winter 1986), pp. 462-466.
Rorty, Richard, "Deconstruction" (to appear in The Cambridge 
History of Literary Criticism).
Rorty, Richard, "Habermas, Derrida, and the Functions of 
Philosophy", a typescript.
Rorty, Richard, "From Logic to Language to Play", APA 
Proceedings, Special Reports, 1986, pp.747-753.
Rorty, Richard, "Does Academic Freedom Have Philosophical 
Presuppositions?" in Academe (vol. 80, No. 6,1994), pp. 52-63.
Rorty, Richard, "Dewey Between Hegel and Darwin" in Herman 
J. Saatkamp (ed.), op. cit, pp. 1-15.
Rorty, Richard, "Philosophy and the Future" in Herman 
J. Saatkamp (ed.), op. cit, pp.197-296.
Rorty, Richard, "Ethics Without Universal Obligations", a 
typescript.
Rorty, Richard, "A World Without Substances or Essences", a 
typescript.
Rorty, Richard, "Truth Without Correspondence to Reality", a 
typescript.
Rorty, Richard, "The Ethics of Principle and the Ethics of 
Sensitivity", a typescript.
Rorty, Richard, "Religion as Conversation-Stopper", a typescript.
Rorty, Richard, "Pragmatism" (to appear in New Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy).
300 Bibliography
Rorty, Richard, "Philosophy Without Principles" in Against Theory. 
Literary Studies andthe New Pragmatism, (ed. W.J.T. Mitchell), 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.
Rorty, Richard, "The State of Philosophy in the United States", a 
typescript.
Rorty, Richard, "The Humanistic Intellectual: Eleven Theses" in 
ACLS Occasional Paper No. 10, American Council of Learned 
Societies, 1989.
Rorty, Richard, "What Are Philosophers For?" in The Center 
Magazine (Sept./Oct. 1983), pp. 40-44.
Rorty, Richard, "Thugs and Theorists: A Reply to Bernstein", 
Political Theory, November 1987, pp. 564-580.
Rorty, Richard, "The Contingency of Language" in London Review 
of Books, April 17, 1986.
Rorty, Richard, "The Contingency of Community" in London 
Review of Books, July 24,1986.
Rorty, Richard, "Another Possible World" in Proceedings on 
Heidegger’s Politics, October 1988.
Rorty, Richard, "Beyond Nietzsche and Marx" in London Review 
of Books, February 19,1981.
Rorty Richard, "Response to Marek Kwiek" in Ruch Filozoficzny, 
op. cit.
Rorty, Richard, "Heidegger, Kundera i Dickens", tr. M Kwiek, in 
A. Szahaj (ed.), Richard Rorty. Między pragmatyzmem a 
postmodernizmem, Toruń, 1995.
Rorty, Richard, "Trocki i dzikie orchidee", tr. M. Kwiek 
(forthcoming).
Rorty, Richard, "Prawa człowieka, racjonalność i uczuciowość", tr. 
M. Kwiek (forthcoming).
Rorty, Richard, "Moralna tożsamość a prywatna autonomia: 
przypadek Foucaulta", tr. M. Kwiek , Etyka, 1993.
Rorty, Richard, "Od ironicznej teorii do prywatnych aluzji: Derrida", 
tr. M. Kwiek, Viel,o,sophie, 1/5/1991.
Rorty, Richard, "Racjonalność i różnica w kulturze: ujęcia 
pragmatyczne", tr. Lech Witkowski in Kultura współczesna nr 1, 
1993, pp. 31-44.
Rorty, Richard, "Brigands et intellectuels" in Critique 493-494, 
Juin-Juilet 1988, pp. 453-472.
Bibliography 301
Rorty, Richard, "Réponses de Richard Rorty à: Jacques 
Bouveresse, Vincent Descombes, Thomas McCarthy, 
Alexander Nehamas, Hilary Putnam" in Lire Rorty. Le 
pragmatisme et ses conséquences, J.-P. Cometti (ed.), pp. 
147-252.
Rorty, Richard, "Discussion entre Jean-François Lyotard et 
Richard Rorty", Critique 456, mai 1985 (réd igé  par 
V. Descombes), pp. 581-584.
Ruch Filozoficzny, texts from the Rorty conference in 1992, with 
his responses: Wokół filozofii Richarda Rorty’ego, vol. L, no. 2, 
pp. 151-218.
Saatkamp, Herman J., Jr. (ed.), Rorty and Pragmatism. The 
Philosopher Responds to His Critics, Nashville & London: 
Vanderbilt UP, 1995.
Said, Edward, Representations of the Intellectual. The 1993Reith 
Lectures, London: Vintage, 1994.
Sartre, Jean-Paul, "What is Literature?" and Other Essays, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1988.
Sheehan, Thomas, "Heidegger and the Nazis", The New York 
Review, June 16, 1988, pp. 38-46.
Sheehan, Thomas, "A Normal Nazi", The New York Review, 
January 14, 1993, pp. 30-35.
Sheehan, Thomas, "Reading a Life: Heidegger in Hard Times" in 
The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, (ed. by Charles 
Guignon), Cambridge: CUP, 1993.
Siemek, Marek J., Filozofia spełnionej nowoczesności -  Hegel, 
Toruń: UMK, 1995.
Siemek, Marek J., "Hegel i problemy filozoficznej samowiedzy 
marksizmu", wstęp do: Lukács, Gyorgy, Młody Hegel, 
Warszawa: PWN, 1980.
Staten, Henry, "Rorty’s Circumvention of Derrida", Critical Inquiry, 
Winter 1986.
Steiner, George, Heidegger, London: Fontana, 1992.
Stoekl, Allan, Agonies of the Intellectual, Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1992.
Strauss, Leo, On Tyranny, New York: The Free Press, 1991.
Szahaj, Andrzej, Ironia i miłość. Neopragmatyzm Richarda 
Rorty’ego w kontekście sporu o postmodernizm, Wrocław: 
FNP, 1996.
302 Bibliography
Taylor, Charles, "Overcoming Epistemology" in Philosophy. End 
or Transformation? op.cit, pp. 464-488.
Taylor, Charles, "Rorty In the Epistemological Tradition" in 
Reading Rorty, op.cit, pp.257-278.
Vidal-Naquet, Pierre, Assassins of Memory. Essays on the Denial 
of the Holocaust, tr. J. Mehlman, New York: Columbia UP, 
1992.
Welimer, Albrecht, The Persistence of Modernity. Essays on 
Aesthetics, Ethics, and Postmodernism, tr. D. Midgley, 
Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991.
Winchester, James J., Nietzsche’s Aesthetic Turn. Reading 
Nietzsche After Heidegger, Deleuze, Derrida, New York: SUNY 
Press, 1994.
Witkowski, Lech, "Homo idisincraticus (Richard Rorty, czyli spór 
o (po)w agę iro n ii"  in Inspiracje postmodernistyczne, 
A. Jamroziakowa (ed.).
Wodziński, Cezary, Heidegger i problem zła, Warsaw: PIW, 1994.
Wood, David (ed.), Derrida: A Critical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, 
1992.
Zeidler-Janiszewska, Anna, "O koncepcjach nowoczesności, 
humanizmie, nihilizmie i śladach nowej antropologii" in Trudna 
ponowoczesność. Rozmowy z Zygmuntem Baumanem, 
A. Zeidler-Janiszewska (ed.), Poznań: Humaniora, 1995.
Zeidler-Janiszewska, Anna, "Postmodernistyczny wizerunek 
(zaangażowanego) intelektualisty" in Oblicza postmoderny. 
Teoria i praktyka uczestnictwa in kulturze współczesnej, 
A. Zeidler-Janiszewska (ed.), Warsaw: Instytut Kultury, 1992.
UNIWERSYTET IM. ADAMA MICKIEWICZA W POZNANIU













Tadeusz Buksiński (Editor in Chief), Bolesław Andrzejewski, 
Anna Pałubicka, Jan Such, Jarema Jakubowski (secretary)
Cover design by Jolanta Rubczak
Cover illustration: Joan Miró, "Woman III", 1965
Copyright © Marek Kwiek, 1996
ISBN 83-7092-026-8
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Instytutu Filozofii 
Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu 
60-569 Poznań, ul. Szamarzewskiego 89c, fax 471-555
Druk: COBRABiD-UNIDRUK s.c.
Poznań, ul. 28 Czerwca 1956 r. 223/229, tel. (061) 31-11-86, 31-11-90
